SUMMONS + COMPLAINT May 29, 2014 (2024)

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Aug 05, 2013 |Ford, Hon. William G. |RP-Mortgage Foreclosure-Residential |RP-Mortgage Foreclosure-Residential |15109/2013

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Oct 11, 2013 |Quinlan, Hon. Robert |RP-Mortgage Foreclosure-Residential |RP-Mortgage Foreclosure-Residential |24443/2013

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May 06, 2014 |Luft, Hon. Martha L. |RP-Mortgage Foreclosure-Residential |RP-Mortgage Foreclosure-Residential |2547/2014

Ruling

BARRY MAITEN VS ANAT EBGI, ET AL.

Aug 28, 2024 |23STCV11238

Case Number: 23STCV11238 Hearing Date: August 28, 2024 Dept: 82 Barry Maiten Case No. 23STCV11238 v. Hearing: August 28, 2024 Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse Department: 82 Anat Ebgi, et al. Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch [Tentative] Order Granting Plaintiffs Application for Writ of Attachment INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Barry Maiten (Plaintiff) moves for writs of attachment against Defendants Anat Ebgi and Joshua Michael Rosenblatt (Defendants) in the amount of $63,074.42.[1] Defendants oppose the applications, which are granted. LEGAL STANDARD Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter, the plaintiff may apply pursuant to this article for a right to attach order and a writ of attachment by filing an application for the order and writ with the court in which the action is brought. (Code Civ. Proc. § 484.010.) The Attachment Law statutes are subject to strict construction. (Epstein v. Abrams (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1168.) Except as otherwise provided by statute, an attachment may be issued only in an action on a claim or claims for money, each of which is based upon a contract, express or implied, where the total amount of the claim or claims is a fixed or readily ascertainable amount not less than five hundred dollars ($500) exclusive of costs, interest, and attorney's fees. (Code Civ. Proc. § 483.010.) The court shall issue a right to attach order if the court finds all of the following: (1) The claim upon which the attachment is based is one upon which an attachment may be issued. (2) The plaintiff has established the probable validity of the claim upon which the attachment is based. (3) The attachment is not sought for a purpose other than the recovery on the claim upon which the attachment is based. (4) The amount to be secured by the attachment is greater than zero. (Code Civ. Proc. § 484.090.) A claim has probable validity where it is more likely than not that the plaintiff will obtain a judgment against the defendant on that claim. (Code Civ. Proc. § 481.190.) The application shall be supported by an affidavit showing that the plaintiff on the facts presented would be entitled to a judgment on the claim upon which the attachment is based. ¿(Code Civ. Proc. § 484.030.)¿In contested applications, the court must consider the relative merits of the positions of the respective parties and make a determination of¿the probable outcome of the litigation.¿ (Hobbs v. Weiss (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 76, 80.) Code of Civil Procedure section 482.040 states in pertinent part: The facts stated in each affidavit filed pursuant to this title shall be set forth with particularity. Except where matters are specifically permitted by this title to be shown by information and belief, each affidavit shall show affirmatively that the affiant, if sworn as a witness, can testify competently to the facts stated therein. As to matters shown by information and belief, the affidavit shall state the facts on which the affiant's belief is based, showing the nature of his information and the reliability of his informant. The affiant may be any person, whether or not a party to the action, who has knowledge of the facts. DISCUSSION A. Notice Plaintiff has provided sufficient notice, and Defendants filed oppositions to the applications. B. Probable Validity of Plaintiffs Claims The application is based on Plaintiffs cause of action for breach of written contract (lease). To establish a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) plaintiffs performance or excuse for nonperformance; (3) defendants breach of the contract; and (4) damages incurred by plaintiff as a result of the breach. (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1367.) Plaintiff submits evidence that he entered a commercial lease with Defendants in February 2017, and that Defendants ceased paying the monthly rent of $2,636.38 on April 1, 2020, after the Covid-19 pandemic commenced. (See Maiten Decl. ¶¶ 3-4 and Exh. A, including Option to Extend, and Exh. B.) Plaintiff also submits evidence of the following: Defendants provided a 30-day notice on October 5, 2020, but continued their occupancy of the premises after the 30 days had expired. In January 2021, Defendants sent an email to Plaintiffs representatives indicating that Defendants would vacate the premises in 30 days. When the 30 days had expired, Defendants did not surrender the keys or confirm that they had vacated the premises. They continued to keep the utilities in their name and pay the utility bills. Plaintiff discovered that Defendants had abandoned the premises on or about July 31, 2021. (Maiten Decl. ¶¶ 5-8.) Plaintiff seeks recovery of principal damages for 16 months (April 2020 to July 2021) of unpaid rent of $2,636.38, for a total of $42,182.08 in unpaid rent. Plaintiff also seeks recovery of late fees of $6,854.59; interest of $4,218.21; and attorneys fees and costs (pursuant to a fee provision in the lease) of either $13,644.8 or $15,000. Plaintiff also indicates that Defendants are entitled to a credit of $3,825.34 for their security deposit (after subtracting $1,000 in labor and material for water damage to the premises). (Id. ¶¶ 8-13.) The court cannot discern from Plaintiffs declaration how the interest was calculated. Further, Plaintiff appears to have confused the calculation of late charges pursuant to paragraph 13.4 (10% of overdue amount or $100, whichever is greater), with the calculation of interest under paragraph 13.5. (See Maiten Decl. ¶¶ 9-10.) The court will grant attachment of late charges of $4,218.21, as that amount is clear under the lease. ($42,182.08 x 10%). The court does not grant attachment of any interest, as Plaintiffs calculations are deficient. Further, Plaintiffs applications are unclear as to whether attorneys fees of $13,644.8 or $15,000 are requested. The court grants attachment of fees and costs in the lesser amount. Defendants have not persuasively opposed Plaintiffs evidence of a probably valid contract claim for unpaid rent from April 2020 to July 2021. Defendants concede that they failed to pay rent starting March 29, 2020, and retained possession of the premises until at least January 2021. (Ebgi Decl. ¶¶ 3-6.) Defendants concede that they served a 30-day notice in October 2020, but did not vacate. (Ibid.) They also implicitly concede that they did not return the keys until July 2021. (Id. ¶ 7.) Defendants do not submit evidence of any notice or written communications between January and July 2021 showing that they informed Plaintiff that they vacated. (See Ebgi Decl. ¶¶ 4-7 and Exh. A.) The court is not persuaded that the pandemic prevented Defendants from returning the keys in some fashion or giving notice that they were vacating. (See Maiten Decl. ¶ 7.) Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff shows a probably valid claim against Defendants in the reduced amount of $56,219.75 ($42,182.08 + $4,218.21 + $13,644.8 - $3,825.34). C. Basis of Attachment Probable Plaintiff establishes a sufficient basis for attachment. [A]n attachment will lie upon a cause of action for damages for a breach of contract where the damages are readily ascertainable by reference to the contract and the basis of the computation of damages appears to be reasonable and definite. The fact that the damages are unliquidated is not determinative. [Citations.] But the contract sued on must furnish a standard by which the amount due may be clearly ascertained and there must exist a basis upon which the damages can be determined by proof. (CIT Group/Equipment Financing, Inc. v. Super DVD, Inc. (2004) 115 Cal.App. 4th 537, 541.) Here, Plaintiffs application for writ of attachment is based on a contract claim for which the total amount allegedly due is in excess of $500. The claim is not secured by real property. Plaintiffs claim arises from Defendants conduct of a trade or business, i.e. commercial art gallery. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs damages are not fixed and readily ascertainable because the number of months of unpaid rent, among other issues, are in dispute. (Oppo. 1.) Plaintiffs damages are fixed and readily ascertainable from the terms of the lease and Plaintiffs declaration. A dispute about the amount of damages does not mean that the damages cannot be readily ascertained and calculated from the lease terms. At heart, Defendants raise issues about the probable validity of Plaintiffs claim, not whether the damages are fixed and ascertainable. D. Purpose and Amount of Attachment The court finds that the attachment is not sought for a purpose other than the recovery on the claim upon which the attachments is based and the amount to be secured by the attachment is greater than zero. E. Reduction of Amount to be Secured, and Exemptions Defendants do not argue, or show, that the amount of attachment should be reduced pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 483.015(b). Defendants have not claimed any exemptions. F. Subject Property Plaintiff requests attachments against Defendants, natural persons, of items listed in Code of Civil Procedure section 487.010(c) and (d). (Application ¶ 9c.) That request is proper. Plaintiff is not required by section 484.020(e) to describe the property sought for attachment with further specificity. (See Bank of America v. Salinas Nissan, Inc. (1989) 207 Cal. App. 3d 260, 267-268 [all-inclusive application satisfies CCP section 484.020(e)].) G. Undertaking Code of Civil Procedure section 489.210 requires the plaintiff to file an undertaking before issuance of a writ of attachment. Section 489.220 provides, with exceptions, for an undertaking in the amount of $10,000. Neither party has argued for a different amount of undertaking. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Based upon the foregoing, the court orders as follows: 1. The application for writ of attachment is granted in the reduced amount of $56,219.75 against each defendant. Although the court is issuing separate writs, Plaintiff shall not attach more than $56,219.75, i.e., the writs are intended to be joint and several. 2. Plaintiff shall post an undertaking in the amount of $10,000 for each writ. /// /// 3. Plaintiffs counsel shall prepare and lodge revised Right to Attach Order After Hearing and Order for Issuance of Writ of Attachment on Forms AT-120 reflecting the courts ruling. 4. Plaintiffs counsel shall provide notice and file proof of service with the court. IT IS SO ORDERED Dated: August 28, 2024 ______________________ Stephen I. Goorvitch Superior Court Judge [1] Plaintiff filed four applications for writ of attachment on May 22, 30, and 31, 2024, three against Rosenblatt and one against Ebgi. All four applications seek attachment of $63,074.42, albeit three seek attorneys fees of $13,644.88, while one (against Rosenblatt) seeks attorneys fees of $15,000. The court treats these applications as one application seeking attachment of $63,074.42 against both Rosenblatt and Ebgi, jointly and severally.

Ruling

JENNIFER JOHNSON VS SIMONE BELLINGER, ET AL.

Sep 03, 2024 |22STCV32796

Case Number: 22STCV32796 Hearing Date: September 3, 2024 Dept: 71 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles DEPARTMENT 71 TENTATIVE RULING JENNIFER JOHNSON, vs. SIMONE BELLINGER, et al. Case No.: 22STCV32796 Hearing Date: September 3, 2024 The Court denies Plaintiffs default judgment packet. The Court sets a hearing on an order to show cause why the complaint should not be dismissed and/or Plaintiffs counsel sanctioned $250 for failing to enter default judgment (California Rule of Court, rule 3.110(h)) on November 7, 2024, at 8:30 AM in Department 71 at Stanley Mosk Courthouse for the following reasons: 1. No request for court judgment (CIV-100). 2. No proposed judgment (JUD-100). 3. No DOEs dismissal. 4. The address listed on the proof of personal service for Aaron J. Byrd and Robert Byrd, Jr., is incorrect. The address should read, 13003 Ruthelen Street Apt 1, Gardena, CA 90249. 5. The prayer for damages in the Complaint does not specify the amount of damages claimed. (See, e.g., Falahati v. Kondo (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 823, 830-831 [court acts in excess of its jurisdiction and the resulting default judgment is void if the court awards default judgment in an amount greater than that demanded in the complaint, including if the complaint does not specify the amount demanded].)

Ruling

FCS055088 - PALOMINO, TORIBIO VS. GUZMAN, JUAN PATOJA (DMS)

Aug 26, 2024 |FCS055088

FCS055088Motion for Attorneys’ FeesTENTATIVE RULINGPlaintiffs’ motion for award of attorneys’ fees is granted in part.Unless attorney’s fees are specifically authorized by statute or the parties have enteredinto an agreement for attorney’s fees, each party to a lawsuit must pay his or her ownattorney’s fees. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1021; Mountain Air Enters., LLC v. SundownerTowers, LLC (2017) 3 Cal.5th 744, 751; Tract 19051 Homeowners Ass’n v. Kemp(2015) 60 Cal.4th 1135, 1142.) Plaintiffs have not established that the parties enteredinto any agreement for attorney’s fees or that attorney’s fees are authorized by statutefor their causes of action for violation of the Unfair Competition Law, breach of thecovenant of quiet enjoyment, and negligence. However, the prevailing party is entitledto recover attorney’s fees for a habitability claim pursuant to Civil Code section 1942.4.(Civ. Code § 1942.4(b)(2).)When a cause of action for which attorney’s fees are authorized by statute is joined withother causes of action for which attorney’s fees may not be awarded, the prevailingparty may only recover on the statutory cause of action unless “the liability issues are sointerrelated that it would have been impossible to separate them into claims for whichattorney fees are properly awarded and claims for which they are not”. (Akins v. Enter.Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1133.) If the moving party does not“meaningfully” enlighten the court as to an appropriate apportionment, the court “shouldexercise its discretion in assigning a reasonable percentage … or simply cast themaside.” (Bell v. Vista Unified Sch. Dist. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 672, 689.)Plaintiffs claim 30.5 hours in prosecuting this action at an hourly rate of $395 for a totalof $12,047.50 (Decl. of Phillips, ¶ 2, Exh. 1), which appear to have been reasonablyincurred and reasonable in amount. However, Plaintiffs make no attempt to properlyapportion the fees between the habitability claim and the other causes of action and nobasis for reasonable apportionment appears from the descriptions of the tasks given incounsel’s time record.Having considered the superfluousness and derivative natures of the causes of actionfor violation of the UCL and the negligence claims, and the distinctness of the conductunderlying the quiet enjoyment and habitability claims, the court apportions 50 percentof the fees to the habitability cause of action. Plaintiffs are awarded $6,023.75 inattorney’s fees as the prevailing party for that claim.Plaintiffs also improperly seek court costs of $1,084.12 as part of this motion. Plaintiffsmust claim these costs in accordance with the rules adopted by the Judicial Council.(Code Civ. Proc. § 1034(a).)Department 7 is inviting you to a scheduled ZoomGov meeting.Join ZoomGov Meetinghttps://solano-courts-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/1611554664?pwd=T3U4QlBGWWNWaGlieXJTcGxIVHRXZz09Meeting ID: 161 155 4664Passcode: 818575One tap mobile+16692545252,,1611554664#,,,,*818575# US (San Jose)+14154494000,,1611554664#,,,,*818575# US (US Spanish Line)

Ruling

PETER HART, ET AL. VS NINE-O-ONE TENTH STREET CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATIONN-PROFIT, ET AL.

Aug 30, 2024 |6/18/2022 |23SMCV00641

Case Number: 23SMCV00641 Hearing Date: August 30, 2024 Dept: I Although the court remains somewhat skeptical, the court does note that there is a new party. While the court doubts that the ROE amendment came as a total shock, the fact remains that the party was newly added. The court will also take the parties at their word that they are more than a little bit optimistic that the case will settle, although the court recognizes that no promise to settle was made. Finally, the court set the trial date before giving the warning it now gives that it will not continue cases. In light of all of that, the court will discuss the matter with counsel. At present, the court is inclined to set a TSC for after the mediation date given the parties optimism that the matter will resolve. The court notes that had it been aware that the ROE amendment would necessitate a continuance of the trial, it likely would have either denied the amendment or set a hearing to determine the effect on the trial.

Ruling

JAMES LEE VS EMAAR LA PROPERTIES, LLC

Aug 27, 2024 |SC129270

Case Number: SC129270 Hearing Date: August 27, 2024 Dept: 207 TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 207 HEARING DATE August 27, 2024 CASE NUMBER SC129270 MOTION Motion for Attorneys Fees MOVING PARTIES Cross-Complainants Emaar LA Properties, LLC and EJL Homes Realty and Construction, Inc. OPPOSING PARTY none MOTION Cross-Complainants Emaar LA Properties, LLC (Emaar) and EJL Homes Realty & Construction, Inc. (EJL) (together, Cross-Complainants) filed the operative Second Amended Cross-Complaint (SACC) against Cross-Defendant JCL Contractors, Inc. (JCL) alleging five causes of action for (1) Breach of Written Contract; (2) Breach of Express Warranty; (3) Breach of Implied Warranties; (4) Negligence; and (5) Declaratory Relief stemming from a dispute over JCLs improper work on a 22-story luxury high rise condominium project called Beverly West. Default was entered against JCL on July 11, 2024, and Cross-Complaints have requested entry of Default Judgment against JCL. Cross-Complainants separately request their attorneys fees incurred in the amount of $277,822.75 to Lee, Landrum & Ingle and $49,845.90 to Pursiano Law, LLP. JCL has defaulted and has therefore not opposed the motion. LEGAL STANDARD Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, which outlines recoverable costs to a prevailing party under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, permits the recovery of attorneys fees when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).) Code of Civil Procedure section 1021 provides [e]xcept as attorneys fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties [&.] Similarly, Civil Code section 1717 provides [i]n any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorneys fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys fees in addition to other costs. (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (a).) The Code of Civil Procedure defines the prevailing party as follows: [T]he party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant. If any party recovers other than monetary relief and in situations other than as specified, the prevailing party shall be as determined by the court, and under those circ*mstances, the court, in its discretion, may allow costs or not and, if allowed, may apportion costs between the parties on the same or adverse sides pursuant to rules adopted under Section 1034. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4).) ANALYSIS Provision 14.1.9 of the parties contract provides: 14.1 Events of Default. The occurrence of any one or more of the following events and the continuation thereof for a period of forty-eight (48) hours following written or oral notice thereof by Contractor to Trade Contractor shall constitute an "Event of Default" by Trade Contractor: 14.1.1 Trade Contractor fails to complete the whole or any portion of the Work in a timely manner, or in the opinion of Contractor, Trade Contractor is not making sufficient progress with the Work, either due to lack of material, personnel or otherwise [. . .] 14.1.3 Contractor or any other trade contractor(s) shall be unable to proceed with the Project or any portion thereof because of any action of Trade Contractor or any employee, agent, subcontractor, supplier or invitee of Trade Contractor or by any person or labor organization purporting or attempting to represent any employee of Trade Contractor or the presence of Trade Contractor or its subcontractors on the Project causes any labor relations problems, including but not limited to picketing, strikes, slowdowns or interference with the operations of Contractor; 14.1.4 Trade Contractor fails to remedy any defect of material or workmanship furnished by it when and as required by Contractor or Contractor's third party peer reviewers [. . .] 14.1.7 Trade Contractor substitutes materials without Contractor's written consent; 14.1.8 Trade Contractor assigns its obligations, or any part thereof, to another trade contractor or supplier without Contractor's prior written consent; or 14.1.9 Trade Contractor violates any other provision of this Agreement; UPON AN EVENT OF DEFAULT, CONTRACTOR MAY, WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE TO TRADE CONTRACTOR, TERMINATE THIS AGREEMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART AND, EITHER THROUGH ITS OWN EMPLOYEES OR THROUGH ANY TRADE CONTRACTOR OF ITS CHOICE, COMPLETE THE WORK OR REMEDY ANY DEFECT OF MATERIAL OR WORKMANSHIP AND UPON SUCH TERMINATION, TRADE CONTRACTOR SHALL BE LIABLE TO CONTRACTOR FOR ANY AND ALL LOSS, DAMAGE OR EXPENSE, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY SUFFERED BY CONTRACTOR FROM SUCH EVENT OF DEFAULT, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEES INCURRED OR PAID BY CONTRACTOR. THE COSTS AND DAMAGES INCURRED BY CONTRACTOR AS A RESULT OF THE ABOVE ACTIONS MAY BE DEDUCTED FROM ALL AMOUNT DUE OR TO BECOME DUE TO TRADE CONTRACTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT, OR ANY OTHER AGREEMENT BETWEEN CONTRACTOR OR ITS AFFILIATES AND TRADE CONTRACTOR, HOWEVER SUCH DEDUCTION SHALL NOT BE DEEMED A WAIVER OR RELEASE OF ANY OBLIGATIONS OF TRADE CONTRACTOR, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY LOSS OR LIABILITY OF TRADE CONTRACTOR IN EXCESS OF ANY SUCH DEDUCTION. IF CONTRACTOR MUST USE ITS OWN LABOR TO COMPLETE ALL OR ANY PORTION OF THE WORK OF THIS AGREEMENT, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO WARRANTY SERVICE WORK, CONTRACTOR'S LABOR SHALL BE CHARGED AT THE RATE OF FIFTY ($50) DOLLARS PER HOUR. IF CONTRACTOR, THROUGH ITS OWN EMPLOYEES OR THROUGH ANY SUCH TRADE CONTRACTOR OF ITS CHOICE, COMPLETES THE WORK PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THIS SUBSECTION, IT MAY USE OR PERMIT ANY SUCH TRADE CONTRACTOR TO USE ALL MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT OF TRADE CONTRACTOR ON THE SITE ON THE DATE OF GIVING SUCH NOTICE. (Exhibit 1.) In connection with the request for default judgment, Cross-Complainants provided proof that JCL failed to remedy defective workmanship it performed. Therefore, Cross-Complainants are generally entitled to recover their reasonable attorneys fees as the prevailing parties in the action. In support of the request, Cross-Complainants have provided the attorney declarations of David S. Lee and David T. Pursiano, along with invoices, demonstrating that Pursiano Law, LLP incurred $49,845.90 in attorneys fees. Cross-Complainants also request $277,822.75 in attorneys fees for Lee, Landrum & Ingle, but the Declaration of David S. Lee and attached invoices only add up to $277,522.75 in attorneys fees. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Cross-Complainants motion for attorneys fees in the amount of $49,845.90 for Pursiano Law, LLP and $277,522.75 for Lee, Landrum & Ingle. Further, the Court will incorporate the attorneys fees award into the final Default Judgment entered against JCL. DATED: August 27, 2024 ___________________________ Michael E. Whitaker Judge of the Superior Court

Ruling

ERLINDA B PANGILINAN, ET AL. VS DARIUS RUTLEDGE, ET AL.

Aug 29, 2024 |23NWCV03751

Case Number: 23NWCV03751 Hearing Date: August 29, 2024 Dept: C PANGILINAN v. RUTLEDGE CASE NO.: 23NWCV03751 HEARING: 08/29/24 #5 Defendants SMOOTH SAILING CONSULTING, LLC; DARIUS RUTLEDGE; and JENNIFER JANE SANCHEZs Motions to Set Aside Defaults are CONTINUED to Thursday, November 7, 2024 at 10:30 a.m. in Dept. SE-C. Defendants SMOOTH SAILING CONSULTING, LLC; DARIUS RUTLEDGE; and JENNIFER JANE SANCHEZs Motions to Quash Service of the Summons and Complaint are CONTINUED to Thursday, November 7, 2024 at 10:30 a.m. in Dept. SE-C. Moving Party to give notice. Defaults were entered against Defendants SMOOTH SAILING CONSULTING, LLC and DARIUS RUTLEDGE on February 2, 2014, and against Defendant JENNIFER JANE SANCHEZs (collectively Defendants) on February 14, 2024. Defendants argue that the defaults should be set aside, and service quashed for the following reasons: · The POS identifies that the Summons and Complaint were served on Defendant Smooth Sailing Consulting LLC on December 22, 2023, but was not served properly either on the Agent for Service of Process or any authorized person. The address identified on the filed Proof of Service was no longer good as Defendants had moved about 2 months prior. · Service as to Defendants Jennifer Jane Sanchez and Darius Rutledge was improper because the documents were improperly left in the bushes with water damage. In Opposition, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants fail to carry their burden of demonstrating that they are entitled to relief from default/to quash service. The matters are CONTINUED as indicated above. The Declarations of Jennifer Jane Sanchez and Darius Rutledge attached to the Moving Papers as evidence to support their arguments are not signed. (See CCP §2015.5.) The Declarations attached to the Moving Papers are insufficient and defective as submitted. Moreover, the Moving Parties submitted new evidence in conjunction with their Reply brief the Declarations of Juan Soto and Jodi Errett. The general rule of motion practice& is that new evidence is not permitted with reply papers&. [A]nd if permitted ,the other party should be given the opportunity to respond. (Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1537-1538.) In the interests of justice, adjudication on the merits, and in the absence of the prejudice to the opposing party, the Court grants the Moving Parties leave to file and serve Notice(s) of Errata with signed Declarations of Jennifer Jane Sanchez and Darius Rutledge attached by no later than September 3, 2024. A Supplemental Opposition addressing the new evidence submitted by the Moving Parties in Reply may be filed and served per Code in accordance with the new hearing date. A Supplemental Reply may be filed and served per Code in accordance with the new hearing date.

Ruling

CITY OF BELLFLOWER VS 20434 SOUTH SANTA FE AVENUE, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, ET AL.

Aug 27, 2024 |24NWCV01017

Case Number: 24NWCV01017 Hearing Date: August 27, 2024 Dept: C City Of Bellflower vs 20434 South Santa Fe Avenue, LLC, et al. Case No.: 24NWCV01017 Hearing Date: August 27, 2024 @ 10:30 a.m. #9 Tentative Ruling Plaintiff City of Bellflowers Motion for Order of Prejudgment Possession and Certification of Tax Information is CONTINUED to Tuesday, October 15, 2024 at 10:30 a.m. in Department SE-C. Plaintiff to give notice. This is an Eminent Domain action. On April 2, 2024, Plaintiff City of Bellflower (Plaintiff) filed this action against Defendant 20434 South Santa Fe Avenue, LLC (Defendant). Plaintiff filed the instant motion on May 6, 2024. On June 17, 2024, in an attempt to reach a settlement, the parties filed a stipulation which provided for, among other things, a Standstill Period of 60 days (i.e., until August 16, 2024). (Stipulation, ¶2.) The parties also stipulated that the hearing on the instant motion would be continued to a date no earlier than 45 days after the last day of the Standstill Period (i.e., September 30, 2024). (Id., ¶5.) The parties have not filed a notice of settlement as of this date. To adhere to the terms of the stipulation, the Motion for Order of Prejudgment Possession and Certification of Tax Information is CONTINUED to Tuesday, October 15, 2024 at 10:30 a.m. in Department SE-C. Opposition and Reply briefs to be filed and served in compliance with the new hearing date.

Ruling

Jason Neel vs United States Real Estate Corporation, et al

Aug 28, 2024 |22CV01758

22CV01758NEEL v. SUPERIOR LOAN SERVICING, et al CROSS-DEFENDANT DONALD SCHWARTZ’S SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE As discussed below, the motion is denied. I. BACKGROUND This is a convoluted fact pattern, which stems from plaintiff Neel’s efforts to forestall theforeclosure of his home and unwind allegedly fraudulent conveyances encumbering his home.Plaintiff’s allegations are as follows: Plaintiff owns property which was purchased “free and clear” in 2018, located at 144Palo Verde Terrace, Santa Cruz. Plaintiff has cognitive impairments. In January and March2018, plaintiff committed various criminal offenses. In March 2018, plaintiff hired DonaldSchwartz and Ed Russo to represent him. In addition to his criminal charges, plaintiff’s erraticbehavior also caused the HOA where his home is located to bring a civil suit against him.Schwartz was his attorney in that matter as well. (FAC ¶¶ 18-20.) According to the allegations in the FAC, from January 2018 to August 2020, plaintiff wasunable to manage his financial affairs, unable to contract with knowledge or understanding, andsusceptible to financial abuse. Between April 2019 and November 2019, plaintiff was declaredincompetent to stand trial for certain criminal offenses. During a portion of this period, plaintiffwas a patient at Napa State Mental Hospital. Plaintiff has been diagnosed with Psychotic orSchizoaffective Disorder, Bipolar II, Dissociative Disorder, and Social Anxiety. Attorney Schwartz raised the issue of plaintiff’s lack of capacity in the HOA civil actionand at one point, requested the court name a guardian ad litem. The guardian ad litemrecommended by Schwartz was Cody Molica. Plaintiff granted a power of attorney (“POA”) to Page 6 of 14Molica to pay his expenses while incarcerated. Molica, a law school graduate who had workedwith both Schwartz and Russo, agreed to serve as plaintiff’s attorney in fact. On 3/17/19,plaintiff executed a POA in favor of Molica. Plaintiff thought his powers were limited to payingbills. (FAC ¶ 21.) Prior to the execution of POA #1, Molica and co-conspirator Derek Wheat had alreadyarranged with defendant CNA Equities Group, LLC (“CNA”) to borrow money againstplaintiff’s residence, which was debt-free. This loan was taken out without either plaintiff’sconsent or knowledge. Molica engaged CNA to broker a loan of $367,500. The lender was Yeva,Inc. dba Saxe Mortgage Co. The escrow was handled by Fidelity Escrow Co. (FAC ¶ 23.) Molica allegedly orchestrated a fraudulent lease agreement between plaintiff and NathanPerry to characterize the loan as one for business purposes. The lease was dated retroactively forthe three-year period of 10/1/17-10/1/20 and called for $2,500/month rent. Neel does not knowPerry and Perry never lived at the residence and ultimately received $10,430 in checks from the2019 loan proceeds. The lease agreement predated Neel’s January 2018 purchase of the Property.(FAC ¶ 24.) Molica is alleged to have completed fraudulent and inaccurate Uniform ResidentialLoan Applications on behalf of Neel, which reported that Neel received $2,500/month in rentalincome from the property. (FAC ¶25.) The net proceeds of the loan were distributed to Schwartz’s Trust account on 3/27/19,where Molica directed Schwartz to distribute the funds. None of the funds were used forplaintiff’s benefit. One check of $60,000 was paid to Jeffrey Vieyre of Funding Solutions. (FAC¶ 26.) On 5/1/19, Schwartz drafted a new POA requiring both Schwartz’s and Molica’ssignatures and stated the POA was only for paying bills and HOA issues and not for aspects ofthe house. At the time the second POA was executed, plaintiff was unaware Molica already usedthe POA to affect his home via the new loan. (FAC ¶ 27.) Molica withdrew over $1,000,000 from plaintiff’s bank account, using the two POAs. Athird POA was executed on 5/28/20. On 9/9/20, Molica refinanced the property for $439,000which paid off the 2019 loan; two days later it was mortgaged for an additional $35,000. (FAC¶¶ 28-30.) Plaintiff contends the refinance was done for no valid financial reason and actuallycost Molica money to obtain. CNA’s files contain another Residential Loan Application signed by Molica withnumerous fraudulent statements. (FAC ¶ 32.) Defendants CNA and Rushmyfile (“RMF”) co-brokered the 2020 Loan. Defendants United States Real Estate Corporation (“USREC”), CNA,and RMF knew Molica had failed to make any of the payments on the 2019 loan, that the Page 7 of 14refinance was fraudulent, that none of the loans were for business purposes, and that the 2020loans were also fraudulently obtained. (FAC ¶34.) After Molica failed to make payments on the 2020 Loan, USREC instructed DefendantSuperior Loan Servicing to commence foreclosure proceedings. Neel has delivered notices ofrecission. USREC filed a Notice of Default and election to sell on 4/16/21. On 7/23/21, USRECfiled a Notice of Trustee’s Sale. II. PLEADINGS A. Complaint and amended complaint Plaintiff originally filed this action in Alameda County on 8/13/21 to halt USREC’spending non-judicial foreclosure. Scwhartz was plaintiff’s original attorney of record, butsubstituted out in favor of plaintiff’s current counsel on 11/19/22. The action was subsequentlytransferred to Santa Cruz Superior Court by stipulation, and thereafter, plaintiff filed hisoperative first amended complaint (“FAC”) on 10/11/22. The FAC added new causes of actionand new party defendants, among others, including the brokers involved in the USREC Loan,CNA Equities Group, LLC (“CNA”) and Rushmyfile, Inc. (“RMF”). The FAC alleges thatplaintiff is a dependent adult who lacks mental capacity, that plaintiff was fraudulently inducedto sign the subject powers of attorney, and that plaintiff had no knowledge of either of the loans.The FAC further alleges that the subject loans were part of an extended scheme to convert andsteal the equity in plaintiff’s property. (FAC ¶¶ 21-38.) The fraud scheme was allegedly directedby unnamed third parties and Molica, the attorney-in-fact appointed in the powers of attorney,who has been defaulted under USREC’s cross-complaint. (FAC ¶¶ 22-23, 28.) The FAC allegesthat the broker and lender defendants facilitated the fraud by accepting fraudulent loanapplications and documentation. (FAC ¶¶ 24-25, 29-35, 40-41.) B. Cross-complaint On 12/13/22, USREC cross-complained against Neel, CNA, RMF, and Molica fordeclaratory relief, reformation, quiet title, equitable subrogation, equitable lien, judicialforeclosure, implied contractual indemnity and equitable indemnity. USREC claims to be a bonafide encumbrancer who made the loan to plaintiff in good faith without knowledge of plaintiff’salleged lack of capacity or the scheme. The cross-complaint seeks to affirm the validity of theUSREC Deed of Trust or, alternatively, force judicial foreclosure of a lien by equitablesubrogation in the amount of at least $407,328, representing the amount of the USREC loanproceeds used to satisfy in full all prior liens against the property. USREC’s Cross-Complaintalso seeks indemnity against brokers CNA and RMF, Molica and Roes 25-50. (Cross-Complaint¶¶41-49.) Page 8 of 14 C. Doe amendment adding Schwartz as defendant On 11/20/23, plaintiff Neel named Schwartz as Doe 1 under his causes of action forabuse of a dependent adult, conversion, and aiding and abetting. Plaintiff alleges that Schwartz,who was plaintiff’s attorney from 2018 to 2022 and had raised plaintiff’s lack of mental capacityin various proceedings, caused Molica to be appointed plaintiff’s guardian ad litem, suggestedplaintiff give Molica the power of attorney for the 2019 loan, drafted at least one other power ofattorney plaintiff signed in favor of Molica and Schwartz, and facilitated distribution of loanproceeds for the benefit of third parties other than plaintiff. (FAC ¶¶ 19-23, 26-30.) Schwartzanswered on 11/27/23. D. Roe amendment adding Schwartz as cross-defendant On 1/26/24, USREC named Donald Schwartz as Roe 25 to the cross-complaint for theseventh cause of action for implied contractual indemnity and for the eighth cause of action forequitable indemnity. (Cross-Complaint, 12/13/22.) On 6/4/24, USREC voluntarily dismissed Schwartz from the implied contractualindemnity cause of action, leaving Schwartz as a Roe for equitable indemnity only. (Dismissal,6/4/24.) III. MOTION A. Moving papers Cross-defendant Schwartz moves to strike the cross-complaint for equitable indemnitypursuant to CCP § 425.16(b)(1), “A cause of action against a person arising from any act of thatperson in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United StatesConstitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to aspecial motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there isa probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (Emphasis added.) Moving party fails to identify the type of free speech allegedly at issue here. Undersection 425.16(e), there are four types of petitioning or speech: (1) Any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) Any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, Page 9 of 14 (3) Any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) Any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. (CCP §425.16(e).) The only protected activity identified by Schwartz is “the filing of this instant action ascounsel for Mr. Neel and handling a completely unrelated trust account transaction.” (MPA p. 8.)This would fall under categories (1) and (2), above. Schwartz contends that his filing of the underlying complaint on Neel’s behalf againstUSREC is petitioning or free speech activity and that USREC cannot succeed on its claim ofequitable indemnity against Schwartz since it is procedurally defective and cannot overcome thelitigation privilege or an attorney’s absolute immunity when acting as an agent. Schwartz relieson Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89, to support his claim. Under Navellier, “thecritical consideration is whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s protected freespeech or petitioning activity.” (Navellier v. Slettin, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 89.) Schwartz alsoargues the equitable indemnity cause of action “insinuates a conspiracy” between Neel andSchwartz and so must comply with CCP § 1714.10 which requires a showing of reasonableprobability of prevailing in the action with supporting affidavits. He contends no suchcompliance with section 1714.10 can be found in the cross-complaint and it is therefore “doomedto failure.” Schwartz contends that the cross-complaint is an end run around the attorney clientrelationship (between him and Neel) and USREC seeks to force him to testify against his client. B. Opposition USREC argues that Schwartz cannot meet the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysissince the indemnity cross-complaint is not based on Schwartz’s right of petitioning or freespeech. It contends that Schwartz has been sued by plaintiff for the fraudulent scheme and byUSREC only for contribution as an alleged joint tortfeasor. It argues that an anti-SLAPP motionis justified only when the conduct upon which the claim is based is an act in furtherance of theright to petition. Merely because some protected activity may have occurred preceding thecomplaint is not enough; the conduct constituting the protected activity is itself the wrongcomplained of. (Park v. Board of Trustees of Calif. State Univ. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1060.) Essentially, USREC argues that no petitioning activity is involved at all in its claim forindemnity in the event it is liable. The Cross-Complaint alleges: “In the event it is determined that the USREC Deed of Trust is invalid, in whole or inpart, such resulting loss to Cross-Complainant will arise solely by reasons of the cross-defendants’ intentional or negligent conduct,” and “if Cross-Complainant suffers loss or damages Page 10 of 14as a result of Plaintiff’s claims, such damages were caused entirely or partly by the breach ofcontract, violation of statutory duty, negligence, fraud, or other tortious conduct of the cross-defendants.” (Cross-Complaint ¶¶ 42, 46.) USREC argues these allegations fail to mention nor rely upon protected petitioning orfree speech activity by Schwartz and instead, they allege a straightforward claim for equitableindemnity against Schwartz and USREC’s other alleged joint tortfeasors based on plaintiff’sallegations of a fraudulent power of attorney and mortgage loan scheme. USREC points out this is Schwartz’s second anti-SLAPP motion in an apparent effort tostall discovery and prevent his deposition from proceeding. The first motion was brought justprior to Schwartz’s noticed deposition, then Schwartz filed for bankruptcy and withdrew the firstmotion. Once the bankruptcy was dismissed, meaning this case’s discovery could proceed,Schwartz filed this second anti-SLAPP motion, effectively staying this case’s discovery again. C. Reply Cross-defendant’s reply argues the cross-complaint against him was filed to gainadvantage and should be viewed with distrust. He contends he never owed any duty to USRECand actually secured restraining orders against it to stop the foreclosure of Mr. Neel’s home. Inshort, the reply does not persuade this Court that petitioning activity arises from USREC’s cross-complaint against Schwartz. III. LEGAL STANDARDS A. Anti-SLAPP The Legislature enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, known as the anti-SLAPP statute, to provide a procedural remedy to dispose of lawsuits and causes of action thatare brought to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and to petition thegovernment for redress of grievances. (See Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1055-1056.) The court must engage in a two-prong analysis on an anti-SLAPP motion, with shiftingburdens of proof as to each prong. In prong one, the court determines whether the conductunderlying plaintiff’s cause of action arises from defendant’s constitutional rights of free speechor petition. (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 395.) This is a threshold issue; if moving partyfails to show the conduct is constitutionally protected, the court need not address prongtwo. (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 733.) Under the second prong,the burden shifts to plaintiff to prove a legally sufficient claim and to prove with admissibleevidence a reasonable probability of prevailing. (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82,88.) Plaintiff cannot rely on the allegations of the complaint but must produce evidence Page 11 of 14admissible at trial. (HMS Capital, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 204, 212.)To defeat the motion, plaintiff need only demonstrate a prima facie case as to either part of theclaim. (Siam v. Kizilbash (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1563, 1570; Weil & Brown, CaliforniaProcedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group) §§ 7:1005, 7:1020.) If the anti-SLAPP is granted, the court may not grant leave to amend to allege or omitfacts demonstrating the complaint is not subject to the anti-SLAPP statute. (Simmons v.Allstate (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1073 [“Allowing a SLAPP plaintiff leave to amend thecomplaint once the court finds the prima facie showing has been met would completelyundermine the statute by providing the pleader a ready escape from [Code of Civil Procedure]section 425.16's quick dismissal remedy. Instead of having to show a probability of success onthe merits, the SLAPP plaintiff would be able to go back to the drawing board with a secondopportunity to disguise the vexatious nature of the suit through more artful pleading. This wouldtrigger a second round of pleadings, a fresh motion to strike, and inevitably another request forleave to amend.”]; Schaffer v. City and County of San Francisco (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 992,1005.) A defendant party who prevails on an anti-SLAPP motion is entitled to recover his or herattorney’s fees and costs incurred on the motion, but not for the entire litigation. §425.16(c). Adefendant who prevails on only part of the motion may be entitled to an award of fees and costs(but only those associated with the successful part of the motion), unless the results of the motionwere so insignificant that the defendant did not achieve any practical benefit from the motion.The court has broad discretion in making this determination. (Weil & Brown, §7:1135.) B. Equitable indemnity A claim for equitable indemnity requires proof that the same harm for which plaintiffmay be held liable is properly attributable in whole or in part to the defendant. (Platt v. ColdwellBanker Residential Real Estate Services (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1439, 1445, fn. 7.) IV. DISCUSSION A. Defendant Schwartz has not met his initial threshold burden – cross-complaint’s cause of action for equitable indemnity does not arise from protected activity Schwartz moves to strike the cross-complaint against him for equitable indemnity. Thatclaim seeks to shift liability from USREC to others (including Schwartz) if plaintiff succeedssince USREC alleges those other parties are really at fault, not it. The proper focus here is todetermine the cause of Schwartz’s potential damages in the cross-complaint, and if that causesprings from Schwartz’s protected activity. Page 12 of 14 Schwartz will only be liable to USREC if plaintiff succeeds in proving USREC is not abona fide encumbrancer and invalidates the deed of trust. To do that, plaintiff will havesucceeded in proving the fraudulent scheme – in which plaintiff alleges Schwartz was a part. Thegravamen of the indemnity claim then is the underlying allegations in plaintiff’s FAC – thescheme – and not in any protected speech by Schwartz. “In determining ‘whether the challenged claims arise from acts in furtherance of thedefendants’ right of free speech or right of petition under one of the categories set forthin section 425.16, subdivision (e). [Citation.] … ‘[w]e examine the principal thrustor gravamen of a plaintiff’s cause of action to determine whether the anti-SLAPP statuteapplies.’’[Citation.] The ‘gravamen is defined by the acts on which liability is based, not somephilosophical thrust or legal essence of the cause of action.’ [Citation.] In other words, ‘for anti-SLAPP purposes [the] gravamen [of plaintiff’s cause of action] is defined by the acts on whichliability is based.’ [Citation.]” (Optional Capital, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss, Hauer 8 Feld LLP(2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 95, 111.) As mentioned, Schwartz fails to identify the category of free speech at issue. “Thedefendant's burden is to identify what acts each challenged claim rests on and to show how thoseacts are protected under a statutorily defined category of protected activity. [Citation.]” (Bonni v.St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009; Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376,396.) The court finds this failure significant since it prevents a full analysis of the allegedprotected activity for the first anti-SLAPP step. Again, the only activity identified by Schwartz is “the filing of this instant action ascounsel for Mr. Neel and handling a completely unrelated trust account transaction.” (MPA p. 8.)But analyzing the acts on which Schwartz’s potential liability is based, there is no protectedactivity at issue here. Schwartz is only liable under the cross-complaint if the USREC deed oftrust is invalidated. The deed is only invalidated if plaintiff proves the fraudulent scheme, inwhich Schwartz allegedly participated. Schwartz’s conduct creating liability under the cross-complaint is not in any way protected activity – it does not arise from his representation of Mr.Neel. Instead, it arises from his tortious conduct against Mr. Neel, likely in contravention to hisethical duty to Mr. Neel. Since Schwartz fails to establish the alleged conduct is protected activity, the court neednot move to the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis. B. Civil Code §1714.10 and agent’s immunity do not afford Schwartz any protection here Schwartz’s argument that cross-complainants failed to comply with the pre-filingrequirements of Civil Code § 1714.10 is meritless. “No cause of action against an attorney for a Page 13 of 14civil conspiracy with his or her client arising from any attempt to contest or compromise a claimor dispute, and which is based upon the attorney’s representation of the client, shall be includedin a complaint or other pleading unless the court enters an order allowing the pleading thatincludes the claim for civil conspiracy to be filed after the court determines that the party seekingto file the pleading has established that there is a reasonable probability that the party will prevailin the action….” (Civil Code §1714.10(a).) There are no conspiracy allegations in the cross-complaint; Schwartz concedes this whenhe admits “[t]he Cross-Complaint insinuates a conspiracy between Mr. Neel’s former attorney(Schwartz) and others….” (MPA p. 9, emphasis added.) Further, the FAC does not allegeconspiracy between Schwartz and his client – it alleges a conspiracy by Schwartz against hisclient. That is not covered by section 1714.10, and if somehow a conspiracy under the codesection had been alleged, it was Schwartz’s duty to bring a motion to strike when he was namedas a Doe, not when he was named as a Roe to a different pleading. Schwartz’s contention that attorney-agency immunity insulates him from liability underthe cross-complaint is also misplaced. As stated, Schwartz is only liable for equitable indemnityif he’s established as a bad actor under the FAC, and in that case, he will be found to have actedagainst his client’s interests, not for them. C. Sanctions against Schwartz Prevailing cross-complainant USREC shall be entitled to reasonable fees and costsincurred on the special motion to strike (not the entire litigation). (CCP §425.16(c); LafayetteMorehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1383.) USREC seeks $9,490.00 ($7,300.00 for the prior withdrawn anti-SLAPP motion and$2,190.00 for the updated opposition to this motion). USREC’s counsel Edward Egan Smith’shourly rate is $365.00 and he declares he spent no less than 20 hours preparing USREC’sopposition to the initial motion and at least six hours updating and preparing this opposition. Thecourt finds that 13 hours of work is a reasonable duration of time preparing an opposition to thislatest motion and awards $4,745.00 in fees to USREC, payable by cross-defendant Schwartz nolater than 9/20/24.Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal orderincorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating thetentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, inaccordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if theprevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative issimply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition ofsanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed. Page 14 of 14

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